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                                                                       Abstract  
This paper builds an overlapping generations household economy model and examines the 
impact of unemployment on child labour and the child's human capital formation and growth 
through the expectation of adult regarding future employability. The economy consists of two 
sectors- skilled sector and unskilled sector. If one individual is employed in skilled sector she 
gets wage proportional to human capital whereas unskilled sector gives a fixed return. 
Expected future earning of child is included in the parental utility function. Parental choice of 
schooling vis-a-vis child work is considered. We study the effect of change in unemployment 
rate, child wage, adult skilled labour wage, adult unskilled labour wage, responsiveness of 
wage to skill level, change in school quality on schooling and human capital growth rate. We 
find that in this model the decision regarding full schooling or partial schooling or zero 
schooling of child is based on parental level of human capital as well as school quality. 
Increase in child wage will increase schooling and human capital growth rate only if adults 
earn less than subsistence consumption expenditure. We also find that as the responsiveness 
of skilled wage to human capital increases, schooling and rate of growth of human capital 
formation increase but if there is no unemployment then schooling hour and growth rate will 
be independent of responsiveness of wage to human capital, lower is the employment rate in 
the skilled sector, lesser is the time devoted to schooling by the child. Increase in unskilled 
adult wage may or may not decrease child labour. But if there is no unemployment increase 
in unskilled adult wage will result in decrease in the incidence of child labour and increase in 
schooling and rise in growth rate. The model dynamics exhibits the possibility of low level 
equilibrium trap. Suitable policies to escape child labour trap are discussed as well. 
 
Keywords: Low level equilibrium trap, Child labour, Unemployment, Human capital, 
Schooling 
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 1. Introduction 
According to ILO report, along with poverty, unemployment of adults is one of the most 
common causes of child labour. Many other studies support this view. Since there exists 
substantial literature dealing with poverty and child labour it is important to identify and 
analyze the link between unemployment and child labour. This paper explores the theoretical 
linkage between unemployment and child labour, through the expectations of the parent over 
whether she believes that the child will get employment in skilled sector in the future and 
time allocation of child by parent for education. Our main interest is to know how expectation 
of parents regarding job prospect of their children in the future and parental human capital act 
as decisive factors in determining current child labour status of the children. While modelling 
expectation of parents, adaptive expectation is assumed. Parents expect present employment 
rate to prevail in the future and believes her child would get employment in skilled sector 
with this probability. If the unemployment rate is high they decide to send their children to 
work. This decision will hamper the child's ability to accumulate human capital and can lead 
to low level equilibrium trap. 
Unemployment of adult labour is considered to be one of the key factors affecting child 
labour. In our paper we show that the rise in current rate of adult unemployment leads to rise 
in child labour hour and decrease in schooling hours and human capital formation of the 
child. A major motivation to study the relationship between adult unemployment and child 
labour are the empirical works that show that even if parents value schooling of child, rise in 
adult unemployment rate may force them to reduce schooling hours of child and send child to 
work. Using data from Mexico, Skoufias and Parker (2002) show that increased work time by 
adult women in poor households tend to prevent the adverse effects of unemployment on 
weekly school attendance of children. However unemployment shock increases the 
probability that children do not continue school in the next year. Fabre and Pallage (2011) 
argue that child labour may serve as a natural insurance mechanism against adverse 
employment shocks hitting the family. Using historical data from a late nineteenth century of 
Philadelphia, USA, Goldin (1978) shows that the impact of adult unemployment raises the 
probability of their children participating in the labour force. Ahn and Ugidos (1996) examine 
the effects of parent's labour market situation on child's education and labour market situation 
using data from Spanish Labour Force Survey. They conclude that unemployed parents 
enormously increase the risk of unemployment of their children while they decrease the 
chance of attainment of higher education, thereby creating intergenerational persistence of 
unemployment and poverty. There are many theoretical papers1 dealing with unemployment 
and human capital accumulation but very few of them have taken into account the problem of 
child labour. 
In child labour literature the relationship between adult wage, poverty and child labour has 
been extensively analysed. Parents generally send their children to school due to abject 
poverty. So a rise in adult wage is expected to reduce child labour. However according to 
Basu (2000), if the rise in wage is achieved by a minimum wage law, it can cause some adults 
to be unemployed and force them to send their children to work. Sarkar and Sarkar (2012) 
show that child labour may persist even if adult income rises. This may happen due to income 
inequality. In general a rise in parental income is expected to have a positive impact on child 
schooling and negative impact on child labour. Wahba (2005) shows that low adult wages are 
key determinants of child labour. Islam and Sivasankaran (2015) study the impact of NREGA 
program on three states of India. They conclude that increase in household income due to 
NREGA program taken up by adults can reduce child labour. However if wages in the 
economy increase or adults take up new jobs, demand for child labour could increase. Ray 
(2000), in his empirical study on Ghana, points out that adult male wage has significant 
impact on child labour as male adult labour and child labour are often considered as 
complimentary to one another whereas movement of female adult wage does not have 
significant impact on child labour. But none of these papers have studied the relationship 
between adult wage and child labour at the backdrop of unemployment. Our paper shows that 
only if there is no unemployment in the adult labour market, a rise in unskilled adult wage 
will result in decrease in the incidence of child labour. However, in the presence of 
unemployment, increase in unskilled adult wage may or may not be accompanied by 
reduction in child labour. The model also shows that if there is no unemployment, then 
schooling hour and growth rate will be independent of responsiveness of adult skilled wage to 
human capital but in the presence of unemployment child labour is always negatively related 
to adult skilled wage. 
Child wage is considered to be another important determinant of child labour. Ray (2000) 
uses data set from Ghana and shows that child labour hours respond positively to child wage. 
Estevez (2011) concludes that child wage subsidies, which are meant to reduce the supply of 
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 Mauro and Carmeci (2003), Saint Paul (1996), Dellas (1997), Davis, Reeve (1997), Brown and Kaufold (1988), Pissarides 
(1992), Robinson (1993) studied unemployment and human capital formation. 
child labour, will also increase the demand for child labour by reducing the cost of hiring one 
unit of child labour. Thus the effect of child wage subsidies on the incidence of child labour 
is ambiguous. The effect of rise in child wage on child labour is particularly important for 
those households who depend on child earnings to meet their subsistence consumption 
expenditure. According to Fan (2004), children's labour market participation raises the 
financial resources spent on their education. Therefore a small increase in child labour may 
enhance child’s human capital. Das and Ghosh (2006) study the implications of Minimum 
Wage Law on labour market. They conclude that a suitably developed Minimum Wage 
Policy will reduce child labour not only in the short run but will ultimately eliminate it in the 
long run. But our paper shows that only if adults of the household earn less than subsistence 
consumption expenditure, a rise in child wage will increase schooling and human capital of 
the child in the short run and growth rate in the long run. 
Besides parental wages and child wages, parental human capital is also another determinant 
of child’s schooling. Empirical study by Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens (2003) reveals that 
increase in parental education has positive impact on academic outcomes of children. Using 
data from Egypt, Wahba (2005) concludes that parents who were child labourers themselves 
are more likely to send their children to work. Using primary data from two districts of 
Pakistan, Khan (2003) concludes that parental education is positively associated with child 
schooling and negatively associated with child labour. Ray (2000a), from his empirical study 
on Peru and Pakistan, confirms the positive impact that adult education has on child welfare. 
Empirical evidence of Brazil (Emerson Souza (2003)) also shows that parental education has 
strong negative effect on child labour status of the children. 
But none of these papers have considered the parental expectation regarding future earning of 
child at the backdrop of unemployment. Mukherjee and Sinha (2006) consider expected 
future earning of child in parental utility function and explore the relation between child 
labour and education in a model where unemployment exists in formal sector. In this paper 
wage in informal sector depends on skill level whereas in the formal sector wage is given. 
However this paper does not consider the dynamics of human capital accumulation in 
presence of unemployment. Since child labour has a persistence property and child labour 
decision is mostly taken by the head of the family there is a strong intergenerational link in 
context of child labour. So overlapping generations model and dynamic setting is needed to 
analyze the vicious circle of child labour present in developing countries. Our paper develops 
a simple overlapping generations model where parents are altruistic towards their children. 
The model allows us to address the issue of child labour in the short run as well as long run 
and show the dynamics of human capital formation of child at the backdrop of adult 
unemployment. 
There exists a substantial literature dealing with child labour trap. Basu and Van (1998) 
propose that since parents dislike child labour, once adult wage reaches minimum they 
withdraw their children from market. This yields two stable equilibria. Veron and Fabre 
(2004) show that poverty trap arises due to subsistence consumption which the household has 
to maintain. In Emerson and Knabb (2007) also child labour trap arises because of 
discontinuous human capital accumulation function and inclusion of possibility of savings. 
Gupta (2001) has also shown child labour trap in two sector small open economy set up. 
Emerson and Souza (2003) have shown in their model, possibility of child labour trap and 
also found the same result empirically in context of Brazilian economy. In their model 
discrete jumps in the returns to education on reaching different stages of education leads to 
binary choice of schooling (either full schooling or zero schooling) which leads to the 
emergence of child labour trap. In Basu(1999), dependence of child labour on adult income 
and nature of the adult wage function leads to intergenerational persistence of child labour 
and thus generates child labour trap. Sarkar and Sarkar (2012) uphold income inequality to be 
a reason behind child labour trap. According to Bell and Gersbach (2001), absence of quality 
child rearing and absence of formal schooling can generate poverty trap and child labour. 
Sasmal and Guillen (2015), by empirically testing state level panel data on India, conclude 
that persistence of poverty across generations leads to child labour trap. According to 
Azariadis (1996), poverty traps can arise due to subsistence consumption, distorted 
international trade in intermediate inputs, demographic transitions when fertility is 
endogenous, technological complementarities in the production of consumption goods, 
financial intermediation services, manufacturers or human capital; coordination failures 
among voters, various restriction on borrowing; indivisibilities in human capital formation or 
child rearing and monopolistic competition in product or factor markets. The model dynamics 
in our paper allows us to derive the conditions under which educational technology binds an 
economy in a child labour trap in the long run in spite of the fact that children undergo full 
schooling in the current period. 
None of the papers mentioned so far theoretically analyze the relationship among 
unemployment, child labour and dynamics of human capital formation. This paper attempts 
to fill this gap. The present paper builds an overlapping generations model of household 
economy consisting of a skilled sector and an unskilled sector. If one individual is employed 
in skilled sector she gets wage proportional to human capital whereas unskilled sector gives a 
fixed return. Expected future earning of child is included in the parental utility function and 
parental choice of schooling vis-a-vis child work is considered. This paper attempts to 
understand the relationship among unemployment, child labour and human capital 
development. In this model the decision regarding full schooling or partial schooling or zero 
schooling of child is based on parental level of human capital. We find in this model that 
lower is the employment rate in the skilled sector, lower is the belief that the child will get 
employment in the skilled sector and therefore lesser is the time devoted to schooling by the 
child. Hence child labour increases and that result in lower growth rate of human capital in 
the long run. in schooling and rise in growth rate. The model dynamics exhibits the 
possibility of low level equilibrium trap. There exists a critical value of parental human 
capital below which the economy is trapped by low level equilibrium while above this critical 
level steady growth of human capital emerges. So there exists a low level trap where children 
of uneducated parents remain uneducated and work as child labour. This model dynamics 
also show that if education system is efficient the families that send their children to full time 
schooling and also some families that send their children for partial schooling can escape 
from low level equilibrium trap. But if the education system is inefficient then some families 
who send their children for full time schooling may end up being at low level equilibrium. 
We also find that if education technology is efficient, we do not get any equilibrium if child 
labour is totally banned. This implies that all the individuals in the economy face positive 
human capital growth rate. In case of even inefficient education technology banning child 
labour leads to unique stable steady state equilibrium of human capital and low level 
equilibrium trap vanishes. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 
describes the short run equilibrium and section 4 discusses the dynamics of human capital 
formation. Concluding remarks are made in section 5.  
 
 
 2. The Model 
We consider an economy that consists of identical households in overlapping generations 
framework2. Each household consists of one adult and one child. We consider two parents as 
one adult and two children as one child. The economy consists of two sectors
and an unskilled sector. If one individual is employed in skilled sector she gets wage 
proportional to human capital whereas unskilled sector gives a fixed return. The adult decides 
the time allocation of the child between work and schooling
depends on family consumption and expected earnings of the child in future
becomes adult he may or may not get job in the skilled sector. If she does not get job in 
skilled sector she gets employed in the un
whether she believes that the child will get job in skilled sector on becoming adult
forecasting depends on present level of unemployment in the economy. Human capital 
formation of the child depends on t
capital of the parent. 
Following Glomm (1997), we assume parental choice of human capital investment. The adult 
decides how much time her child would devote to work in the unskilled sector and how much 
time for schooling by maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint. The adult sends her 
child to school for‘s’ units of time and for the remaining ‘(1
employed in the unskilled sector. Wages earned by the adult and by t
total income of the household. If the child joins the skilled sector, on becoming adult, she 
gets a wage in the skilled sector which is a fixed proportion of the human capital possessed 
by her (δht)5. In unskilled sector the adults 
unskilled sector also get a fixed return which is less than the return obtained by the adults 
from unskilled sector. In this paper we assume A>
                                                          
2
 Overlapping generations framework has been adopted by Becker 
Glomm (1997), Glomm and Ravikumar (1998).
 
3
 In Mukherjee and Sinha (2006), aggregate current consumption and the child’s future earning enter in the parent’s utility 
function.  According to Genicot and Ray (2
affect their incentives to invest. Expectations of the parents from their children affect their utility.
 
4
 In Emerson and Knabb (2007), households form expectations over wh
promise to implement the social security program to eradicate child labour.
 
5
 Hare and Ulph (1979) assume that wage rate depends on ability and amount of education received by an individual.
 
. Utility function of the adult 
skilled sector. Adult forms expectations over 
he time devoted to schooling by the child and human 
-s)’ units of time, the child is 
he child constitute the 
get a fixed return ‘A’. Children, by working in the 
δ . This assumption implies that the 
and Tomes (1979), Acemoglu and Pischke (2000), 
 
010), people’s aspirations for their future well being (or that of their children) 
 
ether they believe the government will keep its 
 
- a skilled sector 
3
. When the child 
4
. This 
 
individuals with zero schooling earn less wage in skilled sector compared to that in unskilled 
sector. 
Like Moav (2005), this paper assumes that human capital evolution is independent of 
physical capital. Human capital accumulation function of a child is assumed to take the 
following form6: 
ht+1 = bstht+ h,            (1) 
where ‘st’ is the time devoted to studies by the child, and ‘ht’ represents the level of human 
capital possessed by the adult; b>0 is a positive constant representing education technology 
parameter and also indicates school quality. It may be treated as indicator of school too. 
h		represents the minimum level of human capital attained by a child even if she does not 
attend school( i.e. st=0).Thus ht+1>0 even if st =0. 
Household income is given by: 
Yt = A+ Aφ (1-st ) ,           (2) 
where Yt is total income of the household, A is wage earned by the adult in unskilled sector 
and φ is the fraction of adult wage that a child labour receives. Here 0<φ<1 is a positive 
constant. 
The household spends its income on purchasing consumption good only. So, the budget 
constraint of the household is given by: 
A + Aφ (1-st ) = pcct ,           (3) 
where pc is the price of the consumption good and pcct represents the total consumption 
expenditure. 
When adults work in skilled sector, household income is given by: 
Yt = wt + Aφ (1-st )  
where wt is the wage earned by the adult in the skilled sector. We assume wage earned in 
skilled sector (wt) is proportional to the human capital acquired by that individual i.e. wt= δht. 
                                                           
6
 According to Contrereas (2008), Emerson and Knabb (2006) and Galor and Tsiddon (1997), human capital of the parents 
play a crucial role in human capital development of the children. 
 
 Utility function of an adult of the representative household is defined as follows: 
Ut = β1 ln (ct -c) + β2 ln [f δ(bstht +h  ) + (1-f) A] )     if ct ≥c  
      = -∞ otherwise,          (4) 
where ct represents consumption,	c represents subsistence consumption. The utility function is 
defined on the range ct≥c. Adult believes that the probability of the child getting job in skilled 
sector is f (present employment rate of skilled sector), (δbstht +h ) is the return that the child 
may get as an adult if he gets job in the skilled sector, adult believes that the probability of 
the child not getting job in skilled sector is (1-f).While modelling parental expectation, 
adaptive expectation is assumed. Parents observe present unemployment rate and expect that 
the same unemployment rate would prevail. So they believe that their children will get 
employed in skilled sector with probability f if the employment rate of skilled sector is f and 
rate of unemployment in skilled sector would be (1-f). It is assumed that whoever does not 
get job in skilled sector gets employed in unskilled sector. Unskilled sector absorbs all the 
residual labour force. So there is no possibility of remaining fully unemployed. A is the return 
that the child may get as an adult if he gets job in unskilled sector. [f δ(bstht +h ) + (1-f) A] 
represents total expected earning of child. 
Let us first apply the model in the short-run equilibrium context, and understand the 
relationship between unemployment and schooling. 
 
3. Short-run Equilibrium when adults work in unskilled sector 
Utility maximization problem of an adult of the representative household is to maximize the 
utility, given by equation (4), subject to budget constraint given by equation (3) with respect 
to the decision variables of the household, viz, ct and st. 
 From the first order conditions7of the above optimization problem, we obtain: 
st = 
	
[		]
	

        
(5) 
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 For detailed derivation please see equations (A.1) and (A.2) of Appendix. 
From equations (A.1), (A.2) and budget constraint,
A+ Aφ(1-st)-pcc >0 is a necessary 
Now st =1 when ht ≥ 
	

Lower is the value of	h		higher
If A> pcc, and A is sufficiently high and 
low and thus higher is the possibility that 
Higher is the adult income more is the possibility that adult can meet her subsistence 
consumption requirements. Then she does not have to
towards family income. Adult instead sends the child to school for more hours.
The conditions for positive schooling are A+ A
implies that even if the total earnings of the household exceed the subsistence consumption 
expenditure of the household, if 
Proposition 1: If initial human capital is higher than
initial human capital is less than 
Differentiating
 
equation
 
(5) with respect to h
  
 

	

= 
		

  . ( 
	

>0 
  
 

	

= - 
		

  . ( 
	

!<0
st is therefore upward rising concave shaped curve.
Till is reached, st=0.[Below 
upward rising curve till h  is reached. Beyond
human capital is a key factor in determining schooling of child and consequently the human 
capital formation of child. 
This result tallies with Oreopolous, Page and Stevens (
Tsiddon (1997), Emerson and Knabb (2006), Glomm and Ravikumar (1998), Mukherjee and 
Das (2008), Contrereas (2008), Khan (2003), Chakraborty and Chakraborty
 it is clear that for positive consumption 
and sufficient condition. 
	

 = h 
 is the chance that ht ≥h. 
pc	 is sufficiently low, higher is the chance that
ht ≥ h i.e. higher possibility of no child labour.
 depend on the child to contribute 
φ-pcc >0 and ht≥ 
		

ht ≤h#, st =0. 
	h  there will be no child labour and if 
h0 there will be no schooling of child.  
t gives 
 
 
,st=0 (corner solution)].Thereafter st 
 h it is parallel to horizontal axis. Thus parental 
2003), Wahba(2005), Galor and 
 h is 
 
 


 =h#. This 
is represented by 
 (2014). These 
papers also point out that parental human capital plays a key role in determining human 
capital formation of child. 
Differentiating st with respect to the probability with which parent believes that the child will 
get employment in the skilled sector f, we have  
 
 


  = 
	
		
			
   > 0         (6) 
Hence as f increases st increases. 
If the parent believes that the child will get employment in skilled sector in the future, parent 
chooses more schooling and less child work in the short run. Parents send their children to 
school in the current period with the belief that they will get job in the skilled sector in the 
future since wage of skilled sector is proportional to human capital acquired. Hence, in the 
short run, when parents believe that children have better prospect of getting job in the skilled 
sector in the future when they become adults, parents will send their children to school for 
more hours in the present period. 
This result tallies with the results of the existing literature e.g. Hanchane, Lioui and Touahri 
(2006), Skoufias and Parker (2002) and Goldin (1978). 
 
Note that8: 
i)  

	
	> 0. This implies that as δ increases i.e. the responsiveness of skilled wage to human 
capital increases, schooling also increases. As δ captures the marginal return to human 
capital, an increase in δ results in an increase in schooling of the child. 
ii) The necessary and sufficient condition for 	 


 > 0 is pcc > A. In this case wage obtained 
from child work is necessary to meet subsistence consumption. Here as φ increases, 
schooling increases. This is because higher earnings by the child obtained by working the 
same number of hours propel the parent to reduce the working hours of the child, necessary 
to meet subsistence consumption needs and instead increases the schooling hours of the child. 
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 For detailed derivation please see equations (A.5), (A.6) (A.7) and (A.8) of Appendix. 
 
 


<0 when pcc< A.  Note that
necessary for household. In this context, as child earns a lower proportion of the earning 
earned by the adult by working in the unskilled sector, schooling rises. This is because lower 
earnings by the child obtained by working the same number of 
reduce the working hours of the child, necessary to meet subsistence consumption needs and 
instead increase the schooling hours of the child.
The result implies that if adults send c
in child wage will reduce child labour but if it is not the case then increase in child wage will 
induce parents to substitute schooling by child work, hence child labour increases. 
of rise in child wage on child labour is particularly important for those households who 
depend on child earnings to meet their subsistence consumption expenditure. According to 
Fan (2004) children's labour market participation raises the financial resources spent
education. Therefore a small increase in child labour may enhance children’s human capital. 
Estevez (2011) concludes that child wage subsidies, which are meant to reduce the supply of 
child labour, will also increase the demand for child labour b
unit of child labour. Thus the effect of child wage subsidies on the incidence of child labour 
is ambiguous. Das and Ghosh (2006) study the implications of Minimum Wage Law on 
labour market. They conclude that a suitably d
child labour not only in the short run but will ultimately eliminate it in the long run. Ray 
(2000) uses data set from Ghana and shows that child labour hours respond positively to child 
wage. In our paper we show that when subsistence consumption expenditure of the household 
is higher than adult’s earning, a rise in child wage can only lead to a rise in schooling of the 
child, but if adults earn sufficiently to meet subsistence consumption expenditure then with 
increase in child wage schooling falls and child labour hour rises.
iii) The sufficient condition for 
earnings of the household exceed the subsistence consumption expenditure of the household, 
as increases schooling falls. This is quite obvious because increase in 
gives more importance to consumption than expected earnings from child. So if the earnings 
of the household are good enough to cover the subsistence consumption expenditure, adult 
will give less importance to expected earnings from the child and hence schooling of the 
 
in this case wage obtained from child work is no longer 
hours induce the parent to 
 
hildren for work only because of poverty then increase 
y reducing the cost of hiring one 
eveloped Minimum Wage Policy will reduce 
 
 
 

	
 < 0 is A + Aφ - pcc>0. This implies that if the total 
The effect 
 on their 
implies that adult 
child will fall with rise in . This reduces the rate of growth of human capital formation in 
the long run. 
iv)  

	
 >0 if β2fδbpc ht>β1A2φ
towards child’s expected income, parental human capital, responsiveness of wage to human 
capital, parental belief that the child will get employment in skilled sector are high, the only 
increase in unskilled wage will increase schooling of child. Otherwise, increase in unskilled 
wage may also lead to reluctance to send the child to school. In that case increase in unskilled 
wage may lead to fall in schooling.
is ambiguous.                                                    
Human capital dynamics in the long run is analysed in the next section
 
4. Dynamics of human capital formation
From equation (5) it is clear that 
formation i.e. equation (1) can be written as: 
ht+1= b st(ht) ht +h 
	
$
	

 = b 

	

 ht + b st 
When st > 0, 
	
$
	

 = b [ 


st= 0,
	
$
	

 =0 
st= 0+ε (where Lt ε →0+), 
Therefore there is a discontinuity in 
 
The relationship between ht and h
following diagram:  
 (1-f). This implies that if subsistence expenditure, preference 
 So the effect of increase in adult wage on child schooling 
                                                                                                                             
. 
 
st is function of ht. Therefore the equation of human capital 
 

&	'
ht > 0 
	
$
	

  >0    
ht+1 curve at point st= 0. 
t+1 and the relationship between st and ht are shown in the 
    
Till h# is reached st=0 and thus s
represented by an upward rising concave shaped curve (Ra T). Beyond
a straight line (aT) parallel to horizontal axis. Till 
straight line parallel to horizontal axis and beyond
sloping straight line. Beyond point f, in full schooling regime h
(since b>bst). We assume b>1. 
bst <1. In Figure 1 we show the case where bs
When the child becomes adult and joins the skilled sector her wage is denoted by w
δ(bstht + h ). If δ(bstht + h )> A,
unskilled sector, then only individuals want to be to be employed in the skilled sector. This is 
called the incentive compatibility condition.
Substituting the value of st from equation (5) in the incentive compatibility condition we get 
the following modified incentive 
 Figure 1 
t coincides with horizontal axis (OR). Beyond 
	h ,
 
h# is reached, ht+1 is represented by a 
	h#  ,ht+1 is represented by an upward 
t+1 curve becomes more steep 
Under the assumption b>1, two possibilities emerge:
t >1. 
 i.e. the return from skilled sector exceeds the return from 
 
compatibility condition: 
 
h#, st is 
st is represented by 
 bst >1 or 
t+1 = 
ht  >  
(	)		

    = h* 
If ht>h*, then one individual wishes to be employed in skilled sector. Similarly if wt+1 = 
δ(bstht +h  )< A i.e. ht<h*, then the individual does not have any incentive to work in skilled 
sector and would rather want to be employed in unskilled sector. 
When δh >A i.e. when the person having lowest skill level, if she gets opportunity to be 
employed in skilled sector, earns higher than unskilled wage, then even the individuals 
having no education wish to be employed in skilled sector. But when opposite happens i.e. 
δh<A, then some of the individuals having some level of education  also prefer to work as 
unskilled worker because that yields higher return than the return of skilled sector with low 
human capital. In this model we assume A> δh. 
h* > h# since  Aφfβ + β.A − δh >0 
When A> δh , then we also get the result that	h* >h9.This implies that when A> δh , all 
children undergoing partial schooling and even some children having parental human capital 
level in [h,	h*]  range undergoing full schooling, will be willing to join the unskilled sector 
on becoming adults. This also implies that problem of child labour occurs only for parents 
employed in unskilled sector.  This case is shown in Figure i. This case is very close to reality 
where we find that low skilled individuals or individuals having poor background often prefer 
to join unskilled labour force in spite of being educated because they know their earning 
prospect is better in unskilled sector than in skilled sector given that their skill is low. 
At steady state equilibria ht= ht+1.  From Figure i we find that there are two steady state 
equilibria-V and Z.  Below V, ht< ht+1. So ht rises. Conversely if ht starts somewhat above V, 
then ht> ht+1. So ht falling. In the long run the economy moves to point V (hc) where ht is 
stuck to hc=h - minimum level and this is the low level equilibrium. On the other hand if 
initial ht is at somewhere below Z (i.e. ht< h*) then ht> ht+1. So ht falls moving towards V 
(low level equilibrium). If initial ht is somewhere above Z (i.e. ht>h*) then ht< ht+1.So ht 
keeps on rising infinitely. Steady state growth at V is stable whereas steady state growth at Z 
is unstable. 
                                                           
9
 See Appendix. 
hc represents the value of ht corresponding to low level equilibrium whereas h* represents the 
value of ht corresponding to high level equilibrium. 
Proposition 2: There exist two steady state equilibria. The low level equilibrium is stable 
whereas the high level equilibrium is unstable. 
Individuals with ht< h#  do not send their children to school (i.e. st=0) and so do their 
descendants in all future generations. Children attain here only a minimum level of human 
capital i.e	h. Since we have assumed return from unskilled sector is higher than return from 
skilled sector for the individuals having human capital level	[	]

, so all these 
individuals will remain employed in unskilled sector generations after generations. Now for 
individuals having skill level between h0 and h* send their children for partial schooling but 
not all their descendants will get opportunity to have even partial schooling because in the 
long run they will be driven towards the equilibrium point hc where the equilibrium schooling 
is zero and their children will work full time as child labour. So this equilibrium (V) may be 
termed as child labour trap. 
If education technology is highly or moderately efficient, i.e. b≥1, h is greater than h*. But if 
education technology is less efficient, i.e. b<1, then	h  will be less than h*. 
h= [		
]
[
 
h* = [		]
[
                 
 
For b≥1, h*<h.However for b<1, h*> h	or h<h*10. 
In Figure i we show the case for b≥1 where	h >h*. 
If the parental human capital belongs to [h*,h] and if education is efficient [b>1,h>h*] then 
also they send their children for partial schooling but their descendants will be lucky to have 
steady growth of human capital. If education system is not that efficient [b<1,h<h*] then 
parents having skill level [h,h*] will send their children for full schooling but their future 
generations will be driven back to child labour trap. 
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 See Appendix. 
The individuals having human capital level belonging to [h , hN] range inspite of being 
employed in low skilled sector will send their children to school for full time. Their future 
generations will work as skilled labour. The individuals having human capital level above hN  
themselves wish to be employed in skilled sector though there is no guarantee that they will 
get opportunity to be actually employed in skilled sector because of the existence of 
unemployment. But they send their children to school full time. So child labour problem does 
not exist for this category. Hence in this model, adults who work as skilled labour will never 
send their children for work. 
Dynasties in this economy may be divided into two groups- dynasties with human capital 
above a critical level h*, where generation after generation there will be steady state growth 
of human capital and dynasties with human capital below that critical level, where generation 
after generation are stuck to low level of human capital. 
When c=0 i.e, even when households do not have to maintain subsistence consumption, then 
also the child labour trap arises. However if β2=0, i.e. when parent’s utility does not depend 
on expected earnings from child, then child labour trap ceases to exist. So the existence of 
child labour trap in the present paper critically depends on the dependence of parental utility 
on expected income of child. 
When	h > h*, parents with human capital level higher than h*(ht>h*) but with  ht< h	send 
their children for partial schooling but over time they will send their children for full 
schooling and in the long run there will be no child labour and they will face steady growth. 
However if	h < h*, the families with initial human capital above h but below h* will send 
their children for full schooling but in future they will face no growth but retardation. Even 
they will converge towards low level equilibrium because of inefficiency of education 
technology. 
Proposition 3: If education technology is very efficient or school quality is very good the 
families that send their children for full time schooling and also some families that send their 
children for partial schooling can surely escape from low level equilibrium trap. 
Several studies point to the importance of school quality as an important determinant of 
schooling and work. However, school quality is virtually never measured directly. It is quite 
possibly the case that, when a family is poised to move children out of the workforce into 
school and fails to do so, the culprit is poor schools. Poor school quality is found to be 
weakly important in rural Ghana (Lavy, 1996) and very important for Africa generally 
(Bonnet, 1993). It should be noted, though, that even if poor 
of formal education, there is an abundance of empirical evidence across Latin America, 
Africa and Asia that the return to education is still quite high and more than offsets the 
foregone income of children in school.
We can also consider the case where b>1 and b
This case is shown in the following figure:
                                                               
In this case we get two equilibria
h*every child goes for full schooling.
schooling may end up being stuck in low level equilibrium trap. 
equilibrium trap in this case as well.
Proposition 4: When b >1 and b
human capital higher than h*send their
capital growth. But some parents having human capital level higher than 
sending their child for full schooling 
We can also consider the case where b
school quality lowers the value 
 
s3 < 1 
 
Figure 3 
- hc and h*. The equilibrium at h* is an unstable 
 But some families sending their child
We get a low level 
 
s3 < 1, at good equilibrium being unstable, all parents having 
 children for full schooling and face positive human 
h
will end up being stuck in low level equilibrium trap
<1 and bs3 < 1. 
 
one. At 
ren for full 
	 but lower that h* 
. 
This case is represented by the following diagram:
                                                            
In this case we get unique stable steady state equilibrium h
good equilibrium exists in this case.
Proposition 5: If education 
children in economy converges
does not exist anymore.  
However, note that if h0 <h then h
not exist any bad equilibrium. 
If b,β., f are high and pc is low then the above is condition is likely to be satisfied. 
implies that when school quality is good, individuals derive more utility from child’s 
expected income compared to present consumption,
subsistence consumption expenditure is less the economy may escape from bad equilibrium. 
Then all individuals in the society will face human capital growth rate.
 
Figure 4 
c. Except child labour trap no other 
 
technology or school quality is poor the human 
 towards minimum level of human capital. Good equilibrium 
t+1 curve will lie above 450 line throughout and there does 
Now h0 <h implies 
[		]

 <h. 
 unemployment rate is l
 
 
capital of all 
This 
ow, and 
Proposition 6: When school quality is good, individuals derive more utility from 
expected income compared to present consumption,
subsistence consumption expenditure is less the economy may escape from bad equilibrium.
 
5. Effect of Child Labour Ban
We may also study the effects of child labour ban
So a child labour ban implies 
Case 1: b>1 
The effects of ban in this case are shown in the following diagram:
 
                                                                      
In this case we do not get any equilibrium if child labour is totally banned. However, all the 
individuals in the economy will face positive human capital growth rate. 
Case 2: b<1 
The effects of ban on this case are shown in the following diagram:
 unemployment rate is low,
 
 in our model. In our model 
h3= bh3 +h. We consider two cases.  
 
Figure 5  
 
 
child’s 
 and 
 
h3= bs3h3 +h. 
 
                                                            
In this case we get unique stable steady state equilibrium of human capital (h
trap vanishes. Thus a child labour ban can be considered as a policy prescription to 
the problem of child labour trap in this case.
 
6. Comparative Static Effects
Let us now study the effect of increase in the belief that the child
skilled sector on the growth rate of human capital.
Let the growth rate of human capital 
Ψ=
	
$	

	

 = 
	
	
Differentiating (7) with respect to f we have:
4

 = 
	
	
		
 > 0 
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*). Child labour 
overcome 
  (7) 
This implies that higher is the belief that the child will get employment in the skilled sector in 
future, higher is the rate of growth of human capital. From the above result and result 
obtained from equation (6) we arrive at next proposition: 
Proposition 7: There is positive relationship between the belief that the child will get 
employment in the skilled sector in the future and the schooling in the short run and the rate 
of growth of human capital in the long run. 
Differentiating (7) with respect to δ we have: 
 
4

 = 

	

 >0 
As δ captures the marginal return to human capital, an increase in δ results in an increase in 
schooling of the child. This in turn increases the growth rate of human capital formation. 
Proposition 8: As the responsiveness of wage to human capital increases, schooling and rate 
of growth of human capital formation increase. If there is no unemployment then schooling 
hour and growth rate will be independent of responsiveness of wage to human capital (δ). 
We also get the result that the necessary and sufficient condition for	4

  > 0 is pcc > A11  
If subsistence consumption expenditure of the household exceeds the wage earned by the 
adult from the unskilled sector, growth rate will increase only if child wage increases. This is 
because higher earnings by the child obtained by working the same number of hours, induce 
the parent to reduce the working hours of the child, necessary to meet subsistence 
consumption needs and instead increases the schooling hours of the child, which in turn 
increase the rate of growth of human capital formation. If subsistence consumption 
expenditure of the household is less than the wage earned by the adult from the skilled sector, 
schooling will increase even if child wage decreases. In this case contribution from the child 
labour of the family towards family income is no longer necessary to meet subsistence 
consumption. Now when child wage decreases substitution effect is stronger than income 
effect. Lesser earnings by the child obtained by working the same number of hours induce the 
parent to substitute the working hours of the child, by schooling hours which increases the 
rate of growth of human capital formation. 
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 For detailed derivation please see equation (A.11) of Appendix. 
Proposition 9: Increase in child wage will increase schooling in the short run and growth rate 
in the long run only if subsistence consumption expenditure of the household exceeds adult 
income. 
Moreover the necessary and sufficient condition for  4

   >0 is β2fδbpccht>β1A2φ (1-f)12. 
If subsistence expenditure, preference towards child’s expected income, parental human 
capital, responsiveness of wage to human capital, parental belief that the child will get 
employment in skilled sector are high, then only increase in unskilled wage leads to increase 
in growth rate, otherwise, increase in unskilled wage may also lead to reluctance to join 
skilled sector and consequently willingness to acquire human capital and this may 
consequently retard growth rate. Note that if there is no unemployment increase in adult 
unskilled wage will result into increase in schooling and increase in growth rate. 
 Proposition 10: Increase in unskilled wage will increase growth rate only if 
β2fδbpccht>β1A2φ (1-f). However, if there is no unemployment, increase in adult unskilled 
wage will result into increase in schooling and increase in growth rate. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks and Policy Prescriptions 
This paper builds an overlapping generations household economy model and examines the 
impact of unemployment on child labour and the child’s human capital formation through the 
expectation of adult regarding future employability. In this model, each household consists of 
one adult and one child. The adult is employed in the unskilled sector.13  The child, on 
becoming adult may join the skilled sector or unskilled sector. If the child joins the skilled 
sector on becoming adult, she earns a wage proportional to her human capital while in the 
unskilled sector she earns a fixed return as an adult. The adult derives satisfaction from 
household consumption and expected earning of child. She forms expectations over whether 
she believes that the child will get employment in the skilled sector in the future. Human 
capital accumulation of the child depends on the time devoted to schooling by the child and 
human capital of the parent. The adult maximizes her utility by making decisions about 
consumption and time allocation of child between schooling and work. We have obtained 
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 For detailed derivation please see equation (A.12) of Appendix. 
 
13
 It is shown that child labour problem does not exist for parents employed in skilled sector. 
some interesting results. Increase in child wage will increase schooling in the short run and 
human capital growth rate in the long run only if adults earn less than subsistence 
consumption expenditure. In the short run, lower is the employment rate in the skilled sector, 
lower is the belief that the child will get employment in the skilled sector and therefore lesser 
is the time devoted to schooling by the child. Hence child labour increases and that result in 
lower growth rate of human capital in the long run. Increase in adult unskilled wage may or 
may not decrease child labour. But if there is no unemployment increase in adult unskilled 
wage will result into decrease in child labour and increase in schooling and growth rate.  
Individuals possessing human capital below a certain level do not send their children to 
school and if human capital exceeds that particular level then parents send their children to 
school but not all their descendants will remain educated in future generations. If return from 
unskilled sector exceeds the return that an individual, possessing minimum level of skill, will 
get from the skilled sector then all children undergoing partial schooling and even some 
children attending school full time will prefer to be employed in the unskilled sector on 
becoming adults as they know their earning potential is better in unskilled sector compared to 
skilled sector. 
The model dynamics shows that there exist two equilibria in case of efficient education 
technology. The low level equilibrium (with low level of human capital) is stable whereas the 
high level of equilibrium (with high level of human capital) is unstable. It implies if initial 
human capital endowment is below a critical level, the economy is trapped in a low level 
equilibrium where human capital is stuck to very low level and there will be no growth. This 
equilibrium may be termed as child labour trap. On the other hand if initial human capital 
endowment is above that critical level, there will be steady state growth of human capital, 
parents will send their children for full time schooling and child labour will not exist 
anymore. This model dynamics also show that if education system is efficient the families 
that send their children to full time schooling and also some families that send their children 
for partial schooling can escape from low level equilibrium trap. But if the education system 
is relatively inefficient then some families who send their children for full time schooling 
may end up being at low level equilibrium. In case of very inefficient education technology 
there exists only one steady state equilibrium that represents child labour trap. 
We also find that increase in child wage will increase schooling and human capital growth 
rate only if adults earn less than subsistence consumption expenditure; as the responsiveness 
of skilled wage to human capital increases, schooling and rate of growth of human capital 
formation increase  but if there is no unemployment then schooling hour and growth rate will 
be independent of responsiveness of wage to human capital;  lower is the employment rate in 
the skilled sector, lesser is the time devoted to schooling by the child. Increase in unskilled 
adult wage may or may not decrease child labour. But if there is no unemployment increase 
in unskilled adult wage will result in decrease in the incidence of child labour and increase in 
schooling and rise in growth rate. 
In our paper we have assumed that schooling of child does not involve any explicit cost. 
Relaxation of this assumption will alter some of the important results of the paper. Moreover 
we have not considered the existence of credit market in our model. Existence of credit 
market can have significant implication for child labour because in spite of parental altruism, 
child labour may be prevalent because of imperfect credit market. In our paper we have also 
assumed that parents expect present unemployment rate to prevail in the future and believes 
that the probability of her child not getting employment in skilled sector matches with this 
current unemployment rate. Thus we have assumed probability of being unemployed to be an 
exogenous variable. But unemployment probability has close connection with length of 
schooling. Individuals with higher educational levels have lesser chance of being unemployed 
than individuals with lower educational level. Thus unemployment probability may be 
determined within the model. All these may be considered for future research. 
Our research has important policy implications. We study the effects of child labour ban both 
in case of efficient and inefficient education technology. In case of efficient technology all 
individuals in the economy will face positive human capital growth rate in case of child 
labour ban. In case of inefficient education technology, instead of multiple equilibrium there 
is unique steady state equilibrium of level of human capital though with no growth. In this 
case low level equilibrium trap vanishes due to child labour ban. Moreover government 
should undertake policies that make education system more effective so that employment rate 
in skilled sector increases. This will boost the confidence of adults and they will be more 
eager to send their children to school in expectation that the children will get employment in 
the skilled sector in future. Moreover to help the households to move out of the low level 
equilibrium trap to the high level equilibrium, parental human capital needs to be increased 
beyond the critical level h*, so that households reach the take off stage where growth keeps 
on increasing. To ensure this the most effective policy is compulsory schooling of adults. Our 
research also suggests that if the education system is more efficient some adults who choose 
partial schooling for their children may also face steady growth rate of human capital and 
hence individuals in a society are more mobile across income classes. This will improve the 
adults’ level of human capital which in turn will have positive impact on child’s level of 
human capital. In this model if education technology improves (i.e. b increase
minimum level of human capital possessed by the child (
shift up and the low level equilibrium trap may be avoided.
policies involving compulsory schooling of adult can reduce the intergenerational 
transmission of low level of human capital and persistence of child labour trap. 
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The optimization problem of the household is to maximize
Z= β1 ln(ct -c) + β2 ln [fδ(bstht 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The decision variables of the household are c
first order conditions for maximization of utility are given by: 
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Let the growth rate of human capital 
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In the above expression, for b>1, the denominator of h* within third bracket> denominator of 
 within third bracket. 
For b=1, the denominator of h* within third bracket= denominator of 
Numerator of h* within third bracket<numerator of 
Therefore for b≥1, h*<h. 
However for b<1, h*> h or h <
h*-h= - 
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Now in the denominator within the third bracket of the above expression, A+A
otherwise we get the corner solution s
no child labour. So we take β2
If A>δh , then the numerator within the third bracket
A- pcc<0, then β2(A- pcc)-Aφβ
case. So we take (A- pcc)>0]. 
Therefore hN-h>0 i.e. hN>h. 
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 within third bracket.
h within third bracket. 
 h*. 
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t=0. Again if β2(A- pcc)<Aφβ1, then s
(A- pcc)>Aφβ1.  
 of the above expression is negative.[If 
1 <0. Then we get the corner solution st=1 i.e. no child labour 
 
 (A.11) 
 (A.12) 
 
φ-pcc>0, 
t=1 i.e the case of 
